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FEMALE JUDGING
Theresa M Beiner*
S judicial watchers have argued for a more gender diverse bench,' political
scientists have been keeping a scorecard on the women who are actually
appointed. Do they judge differently than men?2 Do they favor women in sex
discrimination cases or reproductive rights cases?3 Do they favor criminal
defendants?4 Do they have a broader understanding of civil rights?5 Do theyjudge
in a "different voice"?6 Many studies have attempted to chart differences between
male and female judges. Some have successfully shown such differences,7 while
others have shown no perceptible differences in the decision making between male
and female judges.' Indeed, some studies have found that in certain cases, male
judges may actually be more sympathetic to liberal causes than their female
colleagues.9
This article canvases some of these studies to paint an overall picture of how
women judges are deciding certain kinds of cases. In section II of this article, I
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Profile, 65 JUDICATURE 307, 307-09 (1982); Carl Tobias, The Gender Gap on the Federal Bench, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 171-72 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender, Race, and Partisanship on the Michigan
Supreme Court, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1205, 1215 (2000).
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7. See, e.g., Allen & Wall, supra note 5, at 165; Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 5, at 759-
61.
8. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench:
Clinton's District Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 142-44, 145 & tbl. 2, 146 tbl. 3 (2000)
[hereinafter Segal, Clinton's Appointees] (finding few difference in voting behavior between Clinton's
traditional and nontraditional district court appointees).
9. See, e.g., id. at 144-45, 146 tbl. 3 (finding a gender difference in women's cases (gender
discrimination, sexual harassment, abortion rights and related issues), but it was not women who were
more supportive of these claims, but instead the men who were more supportive of women's issues
cases).
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eschew empirical descriptions of how female judges are doing their jobs, taking a
more anecdotal approach. While I have done this before in an effort to provide a
more nuanced picture of how femalejudges might make a difference in the conduct
of court proceedings beyond simply how they ultimately decide a case,"0 section II
looks specifically at the decisions and careers of the judges who are participating
in this symposium to provide a sense of how they approach judging and their roles
as leaders in the legal community. While it has become fashionable in legal
academic circles for scholars to rely on or even conduct empirical research, there
is much to be gained by other forms of knowledge."' Cases tell stories. Howj udges
reason their way to a conclusion is one form a story can take; this form is
particularly relevant to the development of legal rules. I also consider the
backgrounds of these judges, including their career and family histories. While
political scientists have looked at gender as a discrete category that may or may not
influence decision making, I hope to provide a broader view of what it means to
have a diverse judiciary as well as a less essentialized approach to considering the
perspectives of these judges.
I. WHAT POLITICAL SCIENCE TELLS Us ABOUT FEMALE JUDGING
Political scientists only recently have begun to study whether gender affects
judicial decision making. This more recent focus is a result of finally having a
statistically significant number of women on the bench.'" Generally, studies by
political scientists regarding decision making byjudges have focused primarily on
the political affiliation of the judge or his or her appointing president. This focus
is key to the attitudinal model of judicial decision making. The attitudinal model
"posits that the explanatory power of background characteristics derives from their
contribution to the formation of political attitudes and values, the most proximate
influences on judicial decision making."' 3 Thus, background influences political
beliefs and those beliefs in turn influence decision making byjudges. To the extent
that gender influences ajudge's political attitudes, the attitudinal model would posit
that it would have an effect on the outcomes of cases.
This is not, however, the only theory that addresses the implications of women
on the bench. Women judges also have significance in the context of symbolic or
descriptive representation. Symbolically, having women on the bench provides a
group of people with access to positions of influence so that all members of the
community will come to believe in the fairness of the judicial system. 4 Another
10. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New
Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 597, 610-15 (2003).
11. See generally MARY PoOVEY, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN FACT 1-28 (1998) (discussing how
what constitutes "facts" has changed over time).
12. For example, when President Jimmy Carter took office, there had only been six women
appointed to lifetime federal judgeships in the history of the United States. Elliot E. Slotnick, A
Historical Perspective on Federal Judicial Selection, 86 JUDICATURE 13, 15 (2002).
13. Segal, Clinton's Appointees, supra note 8, at 140 (citing JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATITUDINAL MODEL 231-33 (1993)).
14. See Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench:
Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 597 (1985); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro,
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reason to appoint women to the bench is the assumption that they will advocate for
those who are under-represented in the system itself, sometimes referred to as
substantive representation." In other words, women will advocate for women and,
perhaps, other groups who have been relegated to similar less powerful positions
in government. 6 Thus, elected or appointed female judges may play many roles in
the judicial system that could well add legitimacy and diversity of perspective to
judicial decision making.
There are other ways, less tangible than actual decision making, in which women
judges might make a difference. Interpreting the results of a survey of judges,
political scientist Elaine Martin, who is also a participant in this symposium,
summed up well the differences in perspective that women judges might bring to
the bench:
Their differences might influence such things as decisional output, especially in
cases involving sex discrimination; conduct of courtroom business, especially as
regards sexist behavior by litigators; influence on sex-role attitudes held by their
male colleagues, especially on appellate courts where decisions are collegial;
administrative behavior, for example, in hiring women law clerks; and as noted
in the introduction, collective actions, through formal organizations, undertaken
to heighten the judicial system's response to gender bias problems in both law and
process. "7
Martin posited these conclusions after surveying Carter-appointed federal judges
to determine whether there were differences between the perspectives of male and
female appointees. She analyzed issues such as career and parenting role conflicts,
household responsibilities, and perceptions of sex discrimination at their jobs."
One interesting finding from Martin's research is that 81% of women judges she
surveyed identified sex discrimination as a major problem in the legal profession,
whereas none of the male respondents mentioned it as a problem and only 18.5%
of men referred to racial or class discrimination as a problem.' 9 One can see how
such differences in attitude might be reflected in courtroom demeanor or decision
making.
While Professor Martin relied on perception data, other political scientists have
looked at actual case outcomes in an effort to assess whether gender makes a
difference in decision making. Early studies showed little difference in case
outcomes based on the gender of the judge."0 For example, in 1985, Thomas
Institutional Dynamics on the U. S. Courts ofAppeals: Minority Representation under Panel Decision
Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 301 (2004).
15. See Farhang & Wawro, supra note 14, at 301.
16. See Walker & Barrow, supra note 14, at 597.
17. Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive La Difference?, 73 JUDICATURE 204,
208 (1990).
18. See id. at 205-07.
19. See id. at 207.
20. See id. at 208 (detailing studies prior to 1990). See also Jennifer A. Segal, The Decision
Making of Clinton's NontraditionalJudicialAppointees, 80 JuDICATURE 279,279 (1997) [hereinafter
Segal, Clinton's Nontraditional Appointees]; Martin & Pyle, supra note 2, at 1215 (noting that early
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Walker and Deborah Barrow published a study showing very little difference
between voting behaviors of male and female judges who were appointed by
President Jimmy Carter.2 They surprisingly found that in some instances-cases
involving personal rights issues and regulatory disputes involving the
government-women judges were less liberal than their male counterparts.22
Political scientists Elaine Martin and Barry Pyle suggest that the lack of gender
differences in these early cases may be a result of tokenism-the theory that women
will conform to male norms in male-dominated settings like the judiciary. 3
Likewise, in a study of federal appellate decision making in cases between 1981
and 1990, Songer, Davis and Haire found that gender did not appear to play a role
in obscenity and search and seizures cases.24 Instead, the type of litigant and the
nature of the facts of the case played a more important role in predicting the
outcome in obscenity cases.25 The existence of a warrant, a finding of probable
cause by the trial court, or the trial court's finding of an exception to the warrant
requirement were predictive in search and seizure cases. 6
However, the gender of the judge did play a part in employment discrimination
cases.27 In this area, differences in outcomes based on the gender of the judge are
fairly well documented. One of the earliest studies on this issue was conducted by
John Gottschall and published in 1983. Gottschall studied the voting behavior of
Carter appointees to the courts of appeals. Gottschall found that women favored
claimants in race and sex discrimination cases more than their male colleagues,
although, similar to other studies, there was no meaningful differences in their
voting behaviors in criminal cases.28
Recent studies have supported Gottschall's findings with respect to sex
discrimination cases. A study by Sue Davis and her colleagues found a statistically
significant difference in the manner in which male and female appellate judges
evaluated discrimination cases. This 1993 study found that "[m]ore than 63 percent
of the votes cast by women judges supported the plaintiff's claim of discrimination.
In contrast, male judges supported the plaintiff 46 percent of the time."2 9 These
differences were constant even when the researchers controlled for the political
party of the judge's appointing president. For example, 68% of Democrat-
studies showed no gender differences).
21. Walker & Barrow, supra note 14, at 596.
22. Id. at 608 (noting that women were more likely than men to rule in the government's favor
in regulatory cases).
23. See Martin & Pyle, supra note 2, at 1215.
24. Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender
Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 433 (1994).
25. Id. at 432.
26. Id. at 433.
27. Id. at 434.
28. John Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and
Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 164, 171-72 (1983).
Gottschall did find that the race of the judge appeared to affect decisions in criminal cases, in which
African American males favored criminal accuseds and prisoners as well as sex discrimination
plaintiffs at a higher rate than their white male colleagues. Id. at 172.
29. Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the US. Courts ofAppeals, 77 JUDICATURE
129, 131 (1993) (footnote omitted).
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appointed femalejudges supported plaintiffs' claims, whereas 54.3% of Democrat-
appointed malejudges supported plaintiffs' claims. 30 The differences between male
and female Republican-appointed judges were not statistically significant. The
authors of the study opined that "women may tend to support the claimant in
employment discrimination cases simply because they are likely to have
experienced such discrimination directly, or have encountered gender-related
obstacles in their professional lives, or feel a close affinity with those who have."'"
Thus, having experienced sex discrimination firsthand or other stumbling blocks in
their careers based on gender, female judges may be better at spotting
discrimination when it is an issue in cases.
A recent study of federal appellatejudges conducted by political scientist Nancy
Crowe likewise shows differences in voting behaviors between male and female
judges. Professor Crowe studied nonconsensual cases in the courts of appeals
between 1981 and 1996. In particular, she studied race and sex discrimination
cases.3" Nonconsensual cases are those in which there is not a unanimous
decision.33 Thus, these are cases in which there was some room for disagreement
among the judges. Like Gottschall, Crowe found that the gender of the judge
appeared to play a role in sex discrimination cases. She factored in race and
political affiliation as well as gender. In particular, she found that Republican white
women appointees voted for the plaintiff 53% of the time, whereas Democrat-
appointed white women judges voted for the plaintiff 90% of the time.34 For males,
there was likewise a political party effect, with white male Republican judges
voting for the plaintiff only 28% of the time, while white male Democratic judges
voted for the plaintiff 76% of the time.35 Race factored in as well, with African
American Republican judges voting for the plaintiff 61% of the time and
Democratic African American judges voting for the plaintiff 93% of the time.
36
Perhaps the best way to understand these differences is by viewing them overall.
The voting patterns are set out below in Table 1.
Table 1: Chance of a vote for a sex discrimination plaintiff based on race, gender,
and political affiliation
37
White Male Judge White Female Judge Black Male Judge
Republican 28% 53% 61%
Democrat 76% 90% 93%
30. Id. at 132 & tbl. 5.
31. Id. at 133.
32. See generally Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects ofJudges' Sex and Race on Judicial Decision
Making on the US. Courts ofAppeals, 1981-1996(1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Chicago) (on file with author).
33. Id. at 56.
34. Id. at 83 fig. 3.1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 83.
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Interestingly, these patterns did not remain the same for race discrimination
cases, wherein African American judges-both Republican and Democrat
appointees-were more likely to vote for the race discrimination claimant than
either white male or white female judges, regardless of the judges' political
affiliation. 8 However, Democratic white male and femalejudges were more likely
to vote for a race discrimination plaintiff than white male or female Republican
judges. 9 The differences between white males and white females of the same
political party, however, was not statistically significant.4" Thus, while political
affiliation and race correlated with outcomes in the race discrimination cases
studied, gender did not.
Professor Crowe's findings with respect to political affiliation were supported by
Haire, Humphries, and Songer, who studied published decisions by the United
States Courts of Appeals from 1993 to 1999. In this study of 12,275 cases, the
authors examined civil rights, criminal law, and labor/economic cases.4 They did
find that Clinton's appointees, overall, were more supportive of the liberal position
in civil rights cases than were Republican-appointed judges.4 2 Interestingly, they
found no statistically significant differences between the voting behavior of
Clinton's traditional judges (i.e., white male) and non-traditional judges (i.e.,
women and judges of color). 3 However, they did believe that such a difference
would emerge in criminal and labor/economic cases once more votes were available
for study."
Political scientist Jennifer Segal has conducted two studies of decision making
by Clinton appointees. 41 In her first study, she examined decisions by twenty-four
Clinton appointees to the federal district courts. That study found that female
judges favor the claims of African American plaintiffs half of the time as compared
to their male counterparts, who find for African American plaintiffs only one-third
of the time. However, there were no significant differences in cases involving
women's issues between male and female judges in her sample.46
In a second study, using cases published in the Federal Supplement, Segal paired
up judges appointed during Clinton's first term and found a gender difference in
women's cases (gender discrimination, sexual harassment, abortion rights and other
related issues), but found that it was not women who were more supportive of these
claims; rather, it was men who were more supportive of women's issues cases.47
Women were more supportive of claims involving issues of race and personal




41. Susan B. Haire et al., The Voting Behavior of Clinton's Courts ofAppeals Appointees, 84
JUDICATtJRE 274, 277-78 (2001).
42. id.
43. Id. at 279-80.
44. Id. at 280.
45. Segal, Clinton's Nontraditional Appointees, supra note 20, at 279.
46. Id.
47. See Segal, Clinton's Appointees, supra note 8, at 144-45, 146 tbl. 3.
48. Id. at 146 tbl. 3. These two findings were only statistically significant with p <. 10. Id.
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significance. According to Segal, this data "demonstrates clearly that Clinton's
judges, regardless of gender, have ruled consistently against the out-group position
in each of these sets of sensitive and controversial issues." 9  Thus, simply
appointing a woman judge may not provide differences in outcomes.
While these studies focus on federal courts, studies of state court judges might
reveal a different pattern, as many of thesejudges are elected, rather than appointed,
which may affect their rulings. Indeed, in a study of state supreme court justices,
Allen and Wall found that the majority ofthe women justices they studied exhibited
"pro-women" voting behavior on "women's issues." 0 They summed up their study,
explaining:
[T]he data in this study indicate that women justices perceive a broad spectrum of
women's issues as a single issue dimension. Sex discrimination, sexual conduct and
abuse, medical malpractice, property settlements, and the relationship between child
and parent all appear to be viewed as integral parts of an agenda. And while one study
demonstrates that the presence of a woman justice on a state supreme court increases
the number of pro-women sex discrimination rulings, the research in the present study
indicates that even when the majority of the court opposes an expansion of women's
rights, female justices still hold to their beliefs."'
Unlike studies of federal j udges, state female judges' voting records did not appear
to be the result of political affiliation. As Allen and Wall explain, "while a majority
of women Democratic justices serve on courts dominated by Democratic males,
they still vote in a manner substantially different from their same-party male
colleagues., 52  For example, while female Republican judges voted more
conservatively on criminal and economic cases, all female justices (regardless of
party) tended to vote liberally on "women's issues.""
A more recent study by Martin and Pyle looked at voting behavior on the
Minnesota Supreme Court. In particular, they examined the votes of male and
female judges in non-unanimous cases covering three legal areas:
(1) discrimination cases (including age, religion, disability, race, and gender
discrimination cases); (2) domestic relations cases (including divorce, marital rape,
child support, etc.); and, (3) feminist issues (including reproductive rights, sex
discrimination in employment, and sexual harassment). 4 While the party affiliation
of the judge had a statistically significant effect in discrimination and feminist
issues cases, gender played a role in divorce cases. Specifically, "[r]egardless of
partisanship or race, women are almost 16% more likely to make a liberal Divorce
decision when compared to men.""5 Thus, at the state court level, women may have
49. Id. at 145.
50. See David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, The Behavior of Women State Supreme Court Justices:
Are They Tokens or Outsiders?, 12 JUST. Sys. J. 232, 239 (1987). See also Allen & Wall, Role
Orientation, supra note 5, at 165.
51. Allen & Wall, Role Orientations, supra note 5, at 161 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 162.
53. See id. at 164.
54. See Martin & Pyle, supra note 2, at 1223.
55. Id. at 1231.
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influence on decision making in cases that have real effects on women's lives.
Divorce is quite common, and both the economic prospect of many women and their
continued relationships with their children depend on favorable outcomes in divorce
proceedings.56
Many of the judges who are writing for this symposium are or have been judges
in the state court systems. Perhaps women judges in state courts feel more
comfortable in expressing their views on issues of importance to women than
federal women judges because they are elected to office. As elected judges, they
may believe they have a mandate from the people. While not all female elected
judges have emphasized their gender as a plus-factor on the campaign trail, some
have."
While gender appears to have a mixed influence on case outcomes, enough
studies have shown a gender effect in civil rights cases for one group of researchers
to sum up the results of these studies as follows:
While studies of the influence of race and gender on judicial behavior have not
produced broadly consistent results, a number of the studies have found systematic
differences in decision making by judges along racial and gender lines in the area of
civil rights. Moreover, while these differences ranged from modest to substantial in
substantive magnitude, all of the positive findings were in the ideological direction
anticipated by the advocates of diversification of the bench. That is, women and racial
minority judges appear, on average, to be somewhat more sympathetic than majority
group judges to complaints of civil rights violations. The findings further indicate that
race and gender are complex and distinct categories whose effects vary across issue
areas and do not necessarily move in tandem.58
Thus, while there is no typical "female" approach, the trend in civil rights cases in
particular is for women to judge more pro-civil rights than their male colleagues.
This conclusion prompted these researchers to examine the group dynamic
involved in appellate decision making to determine whether having a woman or a
member of a minority group on a panel might influence a group of judges to take
a pro-civil rights position. Using 400 randomly selected published employment
discrimination cases decided by the federal courts of appeals in 1998 and 1999,' 9
the researchers sought to determine whether the presence of a nontraditional judge
(i.e., women or judges of color) increased the probability of a pro-plaintiff
decision.6' They found that the gender composition of the panel influences the way
male judges on a panel vote. The marginal effect of the presence of one woman on
the panel was to increase the probability that a male judge would vote for the
56. See generally Marleen O'Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children:
Investing in our Future Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1255, 1288-89
(2004) (noting high divorce rates).
57. See Megan McCarthy, Judicial Campaigns: What Can they Tell us about Gender on the
Bench?, 16 Wis. WoMEN's L.J. 87, 104-09 (2001).
58. Farhang & Wawro, supra note 14, at 303.
59. Seeid. at310.
60. See id. at312.
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plaintiff by 19 percentage points.6 However, having two women judges on a panel
did not further increase the probability that either male or female judges on a panel
would vote for the plaintiff beyond the effects.for one female judge.62 As they put
it, "the effects of gender and ideology on individual judges' votes are not driven
solely by a judge's own gender or general ideological position; the gender
composition of the panel influences the behavior of male judges and the general
ideological composition of the panel influences the way all judges on a panel
vote. 63
These researchers argue that their findings support a combination of judicial
decision making models, which they gall the deliberation and bargaining models.
The deliberation model posits that panel decision making is a collegial activity
whereby members of the panel take each others' views seriously in reaching
decisions." The bargaining model relies on the "norm of consensus" (that most
appellate panel decisions are unanimous) to posit thatjudges "confer 'in a spirit of
"give-and-take" (or accommodation) in an effort to reach decisional consensus and
thus avoid public dissension."' 65 Judges who would dissent use that threat "'to gain
concessions from the majority."' '66 Thus, women may influence panel decisions in
more ways than are reflected in their individual votes.67
Interestingly, in her study ofnonconsensual federal court of appeals cases, Crowe
found no statistically significant effect on the voting behavior of white malejudges
based on the presence of a female judge on the panel in either sex discrimination
cases or in a combination of race and sex discrimination cases.68 While this may be
a result of the study's consideration of only cases that involved nonunanimous
decisions, it does show that more research needs to be done on the effects of panel
composition on case outcomes before the effects of a judge's presence and gender
on her co-panelists can be accurately assessed.
1I. THIS SYMPOSIUM'S WOMEN JUDGES
Aside from what political scientists have noted about the effect that gender does
or does not have on judicial decision making, legal scholars and the occasional
political scientist have sought to discover these effects using methodologies other
than statistical studies of case outcomes. For example, law professor Suzanna
Sherry examined the opinions of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in an effort to map
61. See id. at 320.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 321.
64. See id. at 308.
65. Id. at 308 (quoting Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Court of
Appeals, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 461, 479-80 (1968)).
66. Id. at 308 (quoting Steven A. Peterson, Dissent in American Courts, 43 1. POL. 412, 418
(1981)).
67. Id. at 321.
68. See Crowe, supra note 32, at 146. She did, however, find a statistically significant effect for
race, with a white male judge less likely to vote for an employment discrimination plaintiff if there was
an African American judge on the panel.
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out a feminine paradigm of judging.69 While others have disagreed that Justice
O'Connor speaks with a "different voice,"7 the idea that something can be learned
from reading the opinions of women judges is not new. In addition to examining
some of their cases, I outline the career tracks and backgrounds of the judges (to the
extent I could find this information) participating in this symposium in an effort to
determine how gender might impact their decisions.
In this section, I describe some decisions and the background of the judges
participating in this symposium in an effort to get a sense of whether these
particular women judges are the proponents of women's issues that seems possible
based on the studies. I do so in the context of the particular decisions chosen. I
have made no effort to track all their decisions on a particular issue in an effort to
find a pattern. Instead, I searched out cases in which one would, based on studies,
think women might have a distinct perspective. Such cases include sex
discrimination, sexual harassment, domestic relations, and civil rights cases. In
some cases, these women are writing for majorities; sometimes they have joined an
opinion; and sometimes they are in dissent. This snapshot of their decision making
is not an attempt to sum up these judges' approaches to these issues; instead, it is
an attempt to get a general sense of their approach in a non-numerical manner. I
discuss each judge or justice individually, in alphabetical order.
There are several themes that emerge from examining the decisions of these
judges in this anecdotal manner. With respect to their backgrounds, many of them
have been active on gender-related issues, such as gender bias task forces, or in
gender-related organizations, such as the National Association of Women Judges.
Others have written opinions that are pro-woman on issues that are of great concern
to women or other outsiders to the legal system. These judges are a varied group
in some respects, and, as might be expected, no single, typical femalejudge emerges
from this exercise.
A. Justice Deborah A. Agosti
Justice Deborah A. Agosti is a Supreme Court Justice on the Nevada Supreme
Court.7' Prior to sitting on the bench, Justice Agosti was an assistant public
defender and a senior staff attorney with the Senior Citizens Legal Assistance
Program. She eventually practiced as a deputy district attorney and was a trial court
judge. 2 As a judge, she became and still is a member of the Gender Bias Task
Force of her state."3 One would expect Justice Agosti to be sympathetic to women's
issues. As a state supreme court justice, her interest in women's issues is reflected
in several domestic relations opinions.
69. See Sherry, supra note 6, at 544.
70. See Songer et al., supra note 24, at 436 ("[Alnalysis suggests that women judges will speak
in a 'different voice' when dealing with claims of discrimination."); Sue Davis, The Voice of Sandra
Day O'Connor, 77 JUDICATURE 134, 139 (1993) ("O'Connor does not appear to speak in 'a different
voice. "').





In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, Justice Agosti wrote an opinion overturning a trial
court's ruling that an ex-wife could be denied alimony largely based on an
extramarital affair.74 The Supreme Court of Nevada held that it was improper for
the trial court to consider a party's fault in determining an award of alimony."
Instead, the Court, through Justice Agosti, explained that the trial court should have
relied on guidelines established in an earlier case-guidelines which made the ex-
wife in this case a likely candidate for alimony.76 As Justice Agosti wrote:
In this case, the trial judge abused his discretion when he considered Glenda's [the
wife] extra-marital affair in determining that she should not receive alimony. Given the
gross disparity between the parties' incomes, Glenda was obviously being punished for
her affair. Alimony is not a prize to reward virtue. Alimony is financial support paid
from one spouse to the other whenever justice and equity require it. Alimony may not
be awarded or denied in an arbitrary or uncontrolled abuse of discretion.
77
In Rodriguez, the ex-wife made $14,000/year, while her ex-husband had an income
of $75,000/year. Additionally, the ex-wife had health problems, whereas the ex-
husband had none.78
In her Rodriguez opinion, Justice Agosti understood the difficult position that
Glenda, the ex-wife, was left in as a result of her divorce:
Glenda, a middle-aged woman with health problems, was forced to survive on a meager
income after enjoying a comfortable lifestyle within a marriage of lengthy duration. It
is not anticipated that she will ever be able to earn more. In contrast, Antonio maintains
the financial ability to continue to live comfortably. He has risen steadily to a
management position in the casino industry. There is no justice or equity in denying
alimony to a woman who, because of her physical condition, will likely never earn more
than the small amount she now earns. Glenda has been impoverished as a result of the
divorce, while Antonio's financial security is assured because of his far superior
earning power. The trial judge should have analyzed the merits of Glenda's request for
alimony with reference to these factors. The trial judge abused his discretion in failing
to award alimony in a just and equitable sum.79
Justice Agosti's opinion highlighted the differences in the incomes between the ex-
wife and her ex-husband and consequently what that meant to the ex-wife's future
economic welfare.
74. 13 P.3d 415 (Nev. 2000).
75. Id. at418.
76. Id. at 418-19. Included in the considerations were "'the financial condition of the parties;
the nature and value of [the parties'] respective property; the contribution of each to any property held
by them as tenants by the entirety; the duration of the marriage; the husband's income, his earning
capacity, his age, health and ability to labor; and the wife's age, health, station and ability to earn a
living."' Id (quoting Buchanan v. Buchanan, 523 P.2d 1, 5 (Nev. 1974)).
77. Id. at419.
78. Id. at 420.
79. Id.
Summer 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LA WREVIEW
In an interesting dissent, Justice Agosti considered the issue of whether a father
had a due process interest that was violated by court approval of his underaged
daughter's marriage, when the father was without notice and not given an
opportunity to be heard.8" Justice Agosti dissented from the majority opinion
because she found "the only issue raised on rehearing is whether the district court
should be required to conduct a new hearing."'" The factual circumstances of the
case involved a fifteen-year-old girl, SierraDawn, who wished to marry her forty-
eight-year-old guitar teacher.82 Justice Agosti distinguished the case from cases the
majority relied upon that involved minor reproductive rights, arguing that "[tihe
privacy and time concerns present in any abortion decision are absent in a decision
to marry. A minor's desire to marry implicates contracts, parental control and the
adult responsibilities that arise in a marital relationship."83  Justice Agosti
acknowledged the father's interest in parenting his daughter was a fundamental
liberty interest, stating that such a parenting right "includes participating in her
important life decisions."8 4 Justice Agosti argued that the interest of the daughter
in marrying her forty-eight-year-old guitar teacher had to be balanced with the
father's interest in raising his child-an interest the majority downplayed, in her
opinion." She was particularly disturbed by the summary affidavit submitted by
SierraDawn's mother in support of the petition for marriage. The mother was not
present at the hearing; therefore, the judge could not question her motives. As
Justice Agosti noted, "although there is an approximate thirty-year disparity
between SierraDawn and Crow [her guitar teacher], and SierraDawn was only
fifteen years old at the time, the district court failed to ask Karay [her mother] more
specifically why it was in SierraDawn's best interests to marry Crow."86 Justice
Agosti acknowledged the potential for abuse in these situations, citing the recent
conviction of a thirteen-year-old's father who purportedly "married" his daughter
to a forty-eight-year-old friend.8 7 Unlike the majority, Justice Agosti exhibited
concern with the reality ofthis child's situation and showed an understanding ofthe
potential for abuse in a case such as this.
Justice Agosti also showed her concern for the welfare of children in a case in
which she held that a trial court had abused its discretion in ordering the
psychological examination of a child victim under fourteen years of age in a sexual
assault case brought against her father 8 State court judges, unlike federal judges,
have the unique opportunity to hear issues of family law-issues that involve the
welfare of both women and children. In these cases, Justice Agosti was willing to
80. Kirkpatrick v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 64 P.3d 1056, 1064 (Nev. 2003) (Agosti, J.,
dissenting).
81. Id. at 1064 (emphasis added). Justice Agosti authored the court's earlier decision in
Kirkpatrick that is reported at 43 P.3d 998, 1012 (Nev. 2002) (concluding that the marriage between
SierraDawn and Crow was void and ordering the district court to annul the marriage).
82. Kirkpatrick, 64 P.3d at 1058.
83. Id. at 1065 (Agosti, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1066.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1068.
87. Id. at 1069.
88. State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 97 P.3d 594, 594 (Nev. 2004).
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consider the reality of the lives of these children and advocate on their behalf, even
if it meant dissenting.
B. Justice Jean Dubofsky
Justice Jean Dubofsky was a Colorado Supreme Court Justice from 1979 through
1987. Starting her career as a legal services attorney, she was the first woman
appointed to the Colorado Supreme Court. 9 Justice Dubofsky's career on and off
the court has been exceptional. As an advocate for minority group interests, she
argued before the United States Supreme Court for the plaintiff in the landmark case
Romer v. Evans.90 However, well before she took on this case, she had marked
herself as ajudge of distinction, who had a broad understanding of equal protection
cases, as is reflected in the cases she decided as a Colorado Supreme Court Justice.
In particular, Judge Dubofsky was the rare judge who found government actions
irrational even under the lesser rational basis standard applicable to most
governmental classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. In Branson v. City
and County of Denver,9' Judge Dubofsky held that a classification that denied
widow's benefits to fire fighters' widows in cities of over 100,000 if the marriage
occurred after the fire fighter's retirement while allowing such benefits to widows
who lived in cities of under 100,000 and to all police officer's widows was not
rationally related to the state's legitimate state interest of maintaining fiscal
certainty.92 As she explained, "[t]he statutory scheme arbitrarily deprives these
widows of equal protection of the laws, and therefore violates the guarantees of the
[F]ourteenth [Almendment of the United States Constitution and section 25 of
article II of the Colorado Constitution."93 This was due in part to gaps in the "fiscal
certainty" argument.94 For example, the exclusion did not include surviving
dependent benefits for children who were born after the retirement. Three judges
dissented from her conclusion. 9 She similarly found a classification related to
inmates unconstitutional under a rational basis analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause in a case that involved whether an inmate should be given good-time credit
for presentence incarceration.96
In an interesting case involving child support, Judge Dubofsky held that neither
the Due Process nor Equal Protection Clauses were violated by imposing a duty on
a father to pay child support even though the father argued that he had offered to
pay for an abortion during the first trimester. The case involved a challenge to the
Uniform Parentage Act, which obligates both parents pay to support children,
without giving the father the right to decide whether the pregnancy should be
89. The Bell Policy Center, FAQ: Board Members, at www.thebell.org/board.html (last visited
May 2, 2005).
90. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
91. 707 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1985).
92. Id. at 340-41.
93. Id. at 341.
94. Id. at 340.
95. Id. at 341 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
96. People v. Turman, 659 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Colo. 1983) (Dubofsky, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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terminated or, in the alternative, refuse to pay child support because he would have
paid for an abortion.97 This case forced Judge Dubofsky to consider competing
rights and interests-the right of the father to be free from gender discrimination,
a woman's right to privacy in procreation decisions, and the "state's interest in
promoting the welfare of the child."9" While characterizing this as a case that
involved discrimination based on sex, Judge Dubofsky recognized that "the equal
treatment which [the father] seeks could only be achieved by according a father the
right to compel the mother of his child to procure an abortion." 99 This result,
however, was improper under U.S. Supreme Court precedent governing the right to
privacy in a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy.'00 This led Judge
Dubofsky to conclude that "at no stage does the [father]'s right to be free from
gender-based classifications outweigh the substantial and legitimate competing
interest."'°'
Judge Dubofsky's legacy, however, extends well beyond the courtroom and into
her practice after her time on the bench. She has represented minority rights in
cases of national significance. As the lawyer who argued on behalf of Richard
Evans in Romer v. Evans, "2 she was instrumental in protecting gay men and lesbian
women from government discrimination. One commentator described her novel
argument:
Jean Dubofsky's brief for the challengers focused on the functional consequences of
the amendment from the perspective of lesbigays: by preempting local
antidiscrimination protections, the amendment undermined their ability to participate
in the political process; moreover, the amendment's broad denial of state "protection"
to lesbigay people threatened their access to state services and protections of all sorts.
Her conclusion was that the amendment was animated by antigay "antipathy" and not
by the nice values in the state's brief' 3
The Court ultimately agreed with Dubofsky's client's position, holding the
Colorado Amendment unconstitutional, and even acknowledged that the law was
likely motivated by antigay sentiment'104-an argument made by Judge Dubofsky on
behalf of her client.
C. Judge Betty Weinberg Ellerin
Judge Betty Weinberg Ellerin was appointed to the New York Supreme Court
Appellate Division by Governor Mario Cuomo. She is a former member of the
committee to implement the recommendations of the New York Task Force on
97. People in the Interest of S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Colo. 1982).
98. Id. at 1215.
99 ld. at 1216.
100. Id. at 1217.
101. Jd. at 1216.
102. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
103. William K. Eskridge, Jr., SomeEffects ofldentity-BasedSocial Movement on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MicH. L. REv. 2062, 2189-90 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
104. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 634-35.
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Women in the Courts and a member of the New York Judicial Committee on
Women in the Courts.' As the Vice President of the National Association of
Women Judges, she was Chair of the National Task Force on Gender Bias in the
Courts."°6 Like Justice Agosti, one would expect Judge Ellerin to have an
understanding of the difficulties women face in the legal system. Judge Ellerin's
participation in pro-plaintiff majorities in a variety of contexts suggests that she
understands the difficulties that working women (and sometimes men) face.
Although her court does not always identify the name of ajudge who authored each
opinion, in the cases described below, Judge Ellerin voted in the majority.
In D 'Amico v. Commodities Exchange, Inc., Judge Ellerin and her colleagues
held that the Commodities Exchange floor was a place of public accommodation
that could be sued underNew York's anti-discrimination in public accommodations
laws for what amounted to sexual harassment.0 7 As the court observed:
[T]o accept defendants' position would, in effect, enable the COMEX [Commodities
Exchange] to prevent, at will, any woman, or anyone else its members disapproved of,
from trading in commodities simply by discriminating against and/or harassing that
individual sufficiently to discourage her or him from remaining in the profession, and
there would be no recourse under the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296) or its
almost identical Federal counterpart.' 8
The court ultimately affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment for the
defendant.0 9 In other cases, Judge Ellerin has joined judges holding that
employment discrimination plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to support a hostile
environment claim,"0 supported the claim of a male whistleblower who encouraged
his co-workers to bring a sexual harassment claim,"' upheld the denial of a motion
to dismiss under the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense applicable to sexual
harassment claims, finding an issue of fact existed as to whether the harasser was
a corporate proxy," 2 and joined a majority that recognized a continuing violation
theory in sexual harassment cases, which permitted the plaintiff to include incidents
that predated the effective date of the private cause of action for sexual
harassment.' '
In one decision that Judge Ellerin did author, she supported the claims of a
plaintiff who alleged failure to promote and termination based on sex, age and
105. THE AMERICAN BENCH, supra note 71, at 1765.
106. Id.
107. 652 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Espaillat v. Breli Originals, Inc., 642 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). The
plaintiff was also given leave to amend her constructive discharge claim, although she did not allege
sufficient facts to support a "racially hostile environment" claim. Id
111. See Sorrentino v. Bohbot Entm't & Media, Inc., 697 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999) (holding that such conduct "constituted 'opposition' to practices" and therefore was protected
from retaliation).
112. Randall v. Tod-Nik Audiology, Inc., 704 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
113. Batchelor v. Nynex Telesector Res. Group, 623 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
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disability." 4  In this case, the jury found for the plaintiff."' On appeal, the
defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding
of discriminatory intent. " 6 In considering this argument, Judge Ellerin explained
that "[o]bviously, plaintiff could not be expected to establish that the defendants
actually expressed their discriminatory intent, and the record must therefore be
examined as a whole in order to ascertain whether, in light of all the circumstances,
the evidence supports a finding of such intent.""..7 Judge Ellerin concluded that the
"record overwhelmingly support[ed]" the plaintiff's claim." 8 Judge Ellerin
acknowledged the difficulties employment discrimination plaintiffs face on the
crucial issue of intent, and the reality that most employers are savvy enough not to
make overtly discriminatory statements.
Another interesting facet of this decision was Judge Ellerin's handling of the
multiple claims involved in the case. The defendants argued that the plaintiff was
limited to arguing disability discrimination because she had been replaced by a
woman." 9 The court upheld the jury's rejection of this position, explaining:
What both the defendants and the dissent ignore is the fact that under the circumstances
here present the jury was not required to view the denial of promotion to plaintiff and
her subsequent termination as two completely separate and discrete incidents of
discrimination, but, rather, was entitled to view them as an unbroken continuum, with
discriminatory denial of the promotion serving as the direct consequential catalyst of
the ultimate termination of plaintiff's employment.... Fortunately, the law recognizes
that the forms and guises of discriminatory conduct do not always fall neatly into
readily identifiable packages and affords relief so long as the victim can establish that
the conduct occurred "under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.'
20
The contextual nature of Judge Ellerin's approach is striking. She acknowledges
that the various forms of discrimination involved in this case do not occur in a
vacuum, but have a relationship one to the other. It is not uncommon forjudges to
ignore the interrelated nature of various forms of discrimination.' 2 ' All in all, this
series of pro-plaintiff employment discrimination opinions show Judge Ellerin's
understanding of the difficulties plaintiffs face in proving discrimination and the
complexities of workplace discrimination.
114. Soggv. Am. Airlines, Inc., 603 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22-27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
115. Id. at 22.
116. Id. at24-25.
117. Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 26-27.
120. id. at 27 (citations omitted).
121. See THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS v. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE
To REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 26-29 (2005).
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D. Judith S. Kaye
Judge Judith S. Kaye is the Chief Judge of the State of New York. She was
appointed by Governor Mario Cuomo to the New York State Court of Appeals in
1983. A trailblazer, Judge Kaye was the first woman to sit on the court of appeals
and the first woman to hold New York's highest judicial office.122 She was one of
ten women in the class of 1962 at New York University School of Law-a class that
numbered 300 total. 2 3 An outspoken advocate for women, upon appointment to the
bench in 1983, Judge Kaye explained, "I take my gender with me wherever I go."' 24
She is active in various law-related organizations, including serving as the Chair of
the Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children and on the board of
editors of the New York State Bar Journal. She is a prolific author, writing on
issues as diverse as legal process and ethics to the role of women in the law.2 5 She
has been honored by the Cardozo Women's Law Journal and awarded their "most
influential woman in the law" award 26 and by Seton Hall Law School with the
Sandra Day O'Connor Medal of Honor.'27 Looking at herj udicial record, her career
and her scholarly writing, it is easy to see why she was so honored.
When asked if her gender played a role in her judging, Judge Kaye was
forthcoming:
I have read, heard and seen Justice O'Connor answer that question flatly and decisively,
"absolutely not," often followed by quoting Minnesota Justice Jeanne Coyne: "a wise
old man and a wise old woman reach the same conclusion."
In one sense, I agree 100 percent with that observation. Women bring the same
skills to judging-diligence, preparation, impartiality, wisdom. We sweat and struggle
every bit as hard as our male counterparts to reach the right result, to do justice, to
apply and honor the law.
But there's another aspect to all of this-the reason, for example, that it's desirable
on our Court of Appeals to draw its seven members from different parts of the State,
different backgrounds, different life experiences. A person cannot help bringing
something of one's own background and experience to everything we do, and that
includes judges.
There is no question that we have seen changes in the law in the last quarter of the
twentieth century, whether the result of the arrival of large numbers of women in the
courts, or inspired by it-or both. The presence of women in the legal profession has
122. State of New York Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, available at
www.courts.state.ny.us/etapps/jkaye.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
123. Judith S. Kaye, Acceptance of "Most Influential Woman in the Law" Award, 9 CARDOzo
WOMEN'S L.J. 673, 675 (2003).
124. Id. at 676.
125. State of New York Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, available at
www.courts.state.ny.us/etapps/jkaye.htm (last visited May 2,2005). See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Moving
Mountains: A Comment on the Glass Ceilings and Open Doors Report, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 573
(1996); Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 125 (2004).
126. See Kaye, supra note 123, at 673.
127. See generally Judith S. Kaye, A Life in the Law, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 752 (2000).
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played a key role in the development of the law in the last quarter of the twentieth
century-pressures for parity in the workplace, access to all manner of restricted
establishments, meaningful laws on rape and abuse, the recognition of domestic
violence not as a right but as crime, effective child support and child care mechanisms
are but a few examples.
To be specific about the Chief Judge of the State of New York, I spent 21 years of
my life as a commercial lawyer, but for the past 15 years or so years my interests quite
frankly have focused on families-domestic violence, dysfunctional families, the fate
of children in our society and how we can improve it.
Now, is this chromosomal, or is it coincidental? You be the judge.'
That Judge Kaye brings an array of life experiences-life experiences that have
some unique facets because of her gender-is reflected in her judicial decision
making.
Judge Kaye has revealed a sensitivity to discrimination plaintiffs. For example,
in New York City Transit Authority v. State Division of Human Rights, Judge Kaye
reversed a decision by the New York Supreme Court that remitted damages in a
case involving blatant pregnancy discrimination. 29 In that case, the plaintiff bus
driver had requested restricted duty after becoming pregnant. The plaintiff had had
fertility problems for a long time and had previously miscarried. Therefore, her
doctor had recommended her for less onerous duties than driving a bus. In spite of
granting similar requests to men who had temporary physical problems, the Transit
Authority, without explanation, put her back on road service after only one week
on restricted duties. Eventually, the plaintiff miscarried. 3 Three other instances
of discrimination occurred involving pregnancies of the plaintiff, with the Transit
Authority's doctor eventually classifying her in a "no work" status (without
justification) until she delivered a child in a subsequent pregnancy. 3'
The administrative law judge found she was entitled to a total $450,000 in
damages for mental anguish and aggravation for the various instances of
discrimination she experienced. The appellate division, however, concluded that
the award was too high, and reversed, recommending a new award that would not
exceed $75,000.32
The New York Court of Appeals, via Judge Kaye, reversed. The court was much
more deferential to the Commissioner in this case-who was the initial fact-finder.
As Judge Kaye explained:
Here, there were extensive findings by the Administrative Law Judge, confirmed by
the Commissioner, of four separate episodes of discriminatory conduct by the Transit
Authority, and mental anguish and aggravation associated with each, supported by
complainant's testimony, her doctor's testimony, the Transit Authority's own medical
findings, and the evaluation that, compared to the other Division proceedings, the level
128. Kaye, supra note 123, at 676-77.
129. 577 N.E.2d 40, 41 (N.Y. 1991).
130. Id. at 42.
131. Id. at43.
132. ld. at 44.
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of abuse was "shocking." For example, in the June-July 1981 period-for which the
sum of $250,000 was assessed-there are findings that the Transit Authority's refusal
to allow restricted duty compelled complainant's decision to continue driving a bus, the
consequence of which caused and likely will continue to cause her feelings of guilt,
resentment and other anguish over her lost child. The Appellate Division statement that
complainant's feelings of depression after suffering the miscarriage "were not
unequivocally attributable to NYCTA" is a mischaracterization of the Commissioner's
finding that, while there was insufficient proof the Transit Authority's wrongdoing
caused the miscarriage, there was a sufficient link between the Transit Authority's
conduct and complainant's mental anguish after the miscarriage, persisting to the time
of her testimony.'33
Judge Kaye understood the difficult position that the Transit Authority placed the
plaintiff in (a choice between earning a living and risking her unborn child's life)
and the link to her mental anguish.
Judge Kaye also held that lesbian and unmarried heterosexual partners had
standing to become adoptive parents of their partners' biological children.'34
Acknowledging that the primary concern of the adoption statute is the "best
interests of the child," Judge Kaye reasoned that "[t]his policy would certainly be
advanced in situations like those presented here by allowing the two adults who
actually function as a child's parents to become the child's legal parents."' 35 While
alluding to the financial benefits to the child (including life insurance, social
security, etc.) resulting from such adoptions, Judge Kaye also understood the
emotional aspect of parenting that is furthered by such adoptions:
Even more important, however, is the emotional security ofknowing that in the event
of the biological parent's death or disability, the other parent will have presumptive
custody, and the children's relationship with their parents, siblings and other relatives
will continue should the coparents separate. Indeed, viewed from the children's
perspective, permitting the adoptions allows the children to achieve a measure of
permanency with both parent figures and avoids the sort of disruptive visitation battle
we faced in Matter ofAlison D. v. Virginia M. 36
Judge Kaye looked at the situation from the child's perspective-consistent with
her overarching concerns for children. The lack of clarity in New York's adoption
laws, some would argue, would have permitted the court to rule either way in this
case. ' Judge Kaye's careful sensitivity to the underlying purpose behind adoption
law-the best interests of the children-and how children would feel in these
circumstances informed her decision making.
133. Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
134. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995).
135. Id. at 399.
136. Id. (citation omitted).
137. See id. at 405 (acknowledging ambiguity in the law).
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As one commentator summed up: "Kaye is a somewhat 'liberal' judge."' 38
"Other court watchers have noted her 'activist role on matters of social change' and
sympathetic stance towards defendants' rights.' 39  Ultimately deemed
"progressive," Judge "Kaye argues for adapting a statute to situations unimagined
by the legislature."' 40 Perhaps as someone who has juggled a busy legal career,
raising three children, and marriage, Judge Kaye simply has extended her creativity
to another aspect of her life-her judicial decision making.
E. Justice Joan Dempsey Klein
Justice Joan Dempsey Klein is the Presiding Justice for the California Court of
Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three. She was appointed to the court
in 1978 by Governor Jerry Brown.' 4' Prior to that, she served as a deputy attorney
general for the State of California and as a Los Angeles Municipal and Superior
Court Judge. 4 She was the co-founder and first president of the National
Association of Women Judges and founding president of California Women
Lawyers. She served as a member of the advisory committee of the National
Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality for women and men in the
courts.'43 She has received numerous awards for her contributions. The Los
Angeles Trial Lawyers Association selected her as Appellate Justice of the Year for
1990 and the Los Angeles Times named her "Woman of the Year.""' Indeed, the
California Woman Lawyers named its Distinguished Jurist Award in honor of
Justice Klein, who was its first recipient. 45 Perhaps most impressive, Justice Klein
accomplished this while being the mother of five children.'4 6
Through her decisions, Justice Klein reveals herself as a devoted advocate of the
rule of law, while at the same time reading civil rights and other laws expansively
to increase their effectuality. For example, in Swink v. County of Los Angeles,
Justice Klein upheld a jury verdict in favor of a sexual harassment plaintiff,
emphasizing that a reversal would amount to the court reweighing evidence on the
sufficiently severe or pervasive standard, something that was inappropriate for a
court considering the case on appeal.'47 Justice Klein summed up the factual
support for the plaintiff in this case:
138. Vincent Martin Bonventre, New York's ChiefJudge Kaye: Her Separate OpinionsBode Well
for Renewed State Constitutionalism at the Court of Appeals, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1163, 1199 (1994).
139. Marcia B. Smith, Judith S. Kaye: Progressive Decisionmaking Rooted in the Common Law,
59 ALB. L. REV. 1763, 1763 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
140. Id. at 1764.
141. Appellate Counselor Profiles, Profile of Justice Joan Dempsey Klein, available at
http://www.appellate-counsellor.com/profiles/kleinjd.htm (last revised Apr. 29, 2002).




145. California Women Lawyers, Joan Dempsey Klein Distinguished Jurist Award, at
http://www.cwl.org/klein.html (last visited June 20, 2005).
146. Id.
147. No. B144259, 2002 WL 805255 at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2002).
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The evidence at trial established that beginning in late 1995, Swink's co-workers
engaged in a course of conduct which included joking about rape, bringing sexual
lubricant and woman's panties to work, telling Swink to go [to] a strip club, and
spelling plaintiffs first name "Cunthia."'48
Similarly, in Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., Inc., Justice Klein was asked to
overturn a verdict in a sexual harassment victim's favor.'49 The plaintiff in this case
was harassed both verbally and physically (including having her crotch grabbed, her
buttocks pinched, and hands place on her breasts) for three years. 5 ' In this case, the
harasser took the position that he and the plaintiff were involved in a consensual
relationship. The plaintiff denied this.'' Considered with her duties as an a
appellate justice, Justice Klein refused to reweigh evidence or reassess credibility
of witnesses on appeal. 52
In addition, the defendant argued that the trial court has improperly refused to
admit evidence of: (1) plaintiff s viewing of adult films with her spouse at home;
(2) her abortions; and, (3) her prior sexual history and sexual history with
employees other than the harasser.5 3 Justice Klein held that there was no abuse of
discretion on the trial court's part in refusing to admit this evidence. In particular,
she argued that the video viewing was "irrelevant;" "[s]uch evidence could not
logically lead to prove or disprove any of the disputed issues in the case. Further,
any marginal relevance of the videotape viewing would have been substantially
outweighed by the probability of undue prejudice to Zurian."'54
In this case, Justice Klein also read the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act expansively, stating that employers are strictly liable for acts of supervisor
harassment, contrary to the argument made by the employer that it should only be
liable if it had notice of the harassment.' Further, that the harasser's conduct
arguably deviated from company policy did not save the employer from liability.
As long as the jury found that the supervisor acted within the scope of his
employment, the company was liable.' 56
Justice Klein has read other laws expansively in an effort to protect employment
discrimination victims, even when her position may not always prevail. For
example, in Herr v. Nestle US.A., Inc., she held that an age discrimination claim
could be pursued under both the California Fair Employment and Housing Act as
well as California's Unfair Competition Law.'57 Similarly, although ultimately
vacated, Justice Klein held that FEHA did not preempt common law causes of
action that might cover sexual harassment. I"'
148. Id.
149. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
150. Id. at 461.
151. Id. at 461 n.1, 462.
152. Id. at 463.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing CAL. EvtD. CODE § 352).
155. Id. at 466.
156. Id. at 467.
157. 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
158. Rojo v. Kliger, 257 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Cal Ct. App. 1989), vacated 252 Cal. Rptr. 605.
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F. Judge Arline Pacht
Judge Arline Pacht was an administrative lawjudge with the U.S. Department of
Labor and later at the National Labor Relations Board. Her career as an ALJ
spanned from 1979 to 1998. Judge Pacht retired from the NLRB in 1998."9
Her decisions as a judge for the NLRB reflect a fair and balanced approach to
union activities as well as the rights of management. In one case, Judge Pacht found
wrongdoing on the part of Sam's Club, a division of the mega-company Wal-Mart,
who is known for its anti-union activities. 6 In particular, Judge Pacht found that
Sam's Club management improperly had threatened to close the store if there was
a positive union vote. 6' In addition, Sam's Club used pay raises and promotion
promises to garner anti-union votes and loyalty. Particularly ingenious, Sam's Club
awarded promotions prior to the union vote, but did not fill the positions until after
the election, arguing that it wanted to avoid prejudicing the outcome of the election.
Judge Pacht characterized this argument as "disingenuous.',162 As she explained:
To announce the openings shortly before the election, and then delay filling them, while
attributing the delay to the union election, constitutes the most devious, albeit subtle,
course Respondent could have chosen-it was tantamount to dangling a prize just
beyond the bidder's reach until the desired outcome was achieved. This is the same
carrot and stick approach condemned by the Board in DTR, supra, for it surely sends
a message to would-be candidates for promotion to refrain from any sort of union
activity.' 63
Judge Pacht's reasonable approach to the facts in this case led to a finding against
Sam's Club with respect to these allegations.'"
In another interesting decision, Judge Pacht found employees' work stoppage
protected under Section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act where
employees stopped working to protest dangerous conditions at their workplace. 6
The facts of the case are fairly outrageous. The workers were employed by TNS,
159. International Judicial Academy, Academy Directors and Officers, at http://www.ija-
dc.org/directoff.html (last visited May 2, 2005).
160. See Chris Ford, What Are "Friends" For? In NAFTA Chapter II Disputes, Accepting Amici
WouldHelp Lift the Curtain of Secrecy Surrounding Investor-State Arbitrations, 11 Sw. J.L. & TRADE
AM. 207,220 (2005); Scott L. Cummings, Beyond the Beltway: The New Politics ofPoverty, 13 ABA
J. AFFORDABLEHOUSiNG&COMMUNITYDEV.L. 159,161(2004); Rita Bhatnager, Dukes v. Wal-Mart
as a Catalystfor Social Activism, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 246, 250 (2004) (all acknowledging
Wal-Mart as "anti-union").
161. Sam's Club, 325 NLRB 124, 1997 WL 724902, at * 15 (Nov. 8, 1997). This portion of Judge
Pacht's decision was ultimately reversed by the Fourth Circuit. See Sam's Club v. NLRB, 173 F.3d
233, 239 (4th Cir. 1999).
162, Sam's Club, 1997 WL 724902, at *21.
163. Id. at *22.
164. Sam's Club did not lose as to all allegations against it. Instead, Judge Pacht carefully
evaluated the facts relevant to each allegations, bringing a common sense approach to her judgements.
165. See John W. McKendree, TNS Inc. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers: Labor Section




a Tennessee corporation that manufactured armor-piercing projectiles. Depleted
uranium was used in the manufacture of its products.' 66 The employees were
represented by a union up to the date that they started their work stoppage. As one
commentator described:
The production process that caused the work stoppage conjures up images of
environmental horror: Dust and smoke were omnipresent and came from a variety of
sources. It all began in the weighing and blending areas, where 55-gallon drums of
radioactive uranium tetrafloride, known as "greensalt," were unloaded. This powder
was often accidentally spread on the floor, the result of spillage and barrels being
pierced by forklifts with crab-like pinchers. The spills were not immediately cleaned
up. In violation of federal regulations and the plant's own internal operating
procedures, the radioactive material was trailed throughout the plant by machines and
workers alike. The greensalt was then loaded into pots, called "retorts," prior to
delivery to the furnace. During the loading process, employees were required to tamp
the greensalt into the retorts. This action caused more radioactive dust emissions.
Inadequate safety precautions and overfilling often caused greensalt to spill over the
sides of the retorts and onto the floor. The plant had horse-collar-shaped safety devices
that fit over the top of the retorts that could have prevented some of this spillage.
However, these devices were often unused because they cut down on the rate of
production and were only partially effective." 7
Employees stopped working only after repeated complaints to management with no
results and after a trip to another plant in California revealed to employees that
working conditions could be made much safer. Judge Pacht's decision protected
the worker's right to strike under these circumstances, and she further held that
TNS, "by assuring its workforce that the former strikers would not be reinstated
with their seniority rights intact, interfered with, coerced, and restrained its
employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights, thereby independently violating
§ 8(a)(1) of the Act."'68 Judge Pacht's decision in this case was ultimately
overturned by the NLRB, which decided that the conditions were not abnormally
dangerous and therefore did not warrant the work stoppage. '6 9 While ultimately her
position did not prevail, Judge Pacht showed her understanding of the difficulties
faced by these workers.
Judge Pacht's presence as an influential femalejudge continued after she stepped
down from the bench to become the executive director of the International
Association of Women Judges. The IAWJ is a non-profit organization of over
4,000 judges representing eighty-six countries. The organization is committed to
"equal justice and the rule of law."' 7 Judge Pacht was also its founding president.
One of the organization's programs, the Jurisprudence of Equality Program, seeks
166. See id. at 196.
167. Id. at 197.
168. Id. at 200.
169. TNS, Inc. and Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 309 NLRB 1348, 1459 (Dec.
23, 1992).
170. International Association of Women Judges, Welcome, at http://www.iawj.org (last visited
May 2, 2005).
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to "build a true 'jurisprudence of equality'-one based on universal principles of
human rights and nondiscrimination." '' ,In -her various roles within this
organization, Judge Pacht was instrumental in creating the organization's human
rights education program for judges. Since 1993, the Women Judges Foundation,
which is the "educational arm" of the IAWJ, has provided educational and public
services programs aimed at legal issues affecting women and children. One facet
of the Jurisprudence of Equality Program targets judicial training, whereby the
organization trains teams who lead human rights seminars for judicial officers and
conduct seminars for judges and related professionals.' Thus, Judge Pacht's
influence on human rights extends beyond the borders of the United States into
other countries.
G. Judge Dolores K. Sloviter
Judge Dolores K. Sloviter was appointed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
by President Carter. Initially in private practice, Judge Sloviter was also a law
professor at Temple University. ' In several interesting decisions, Judge Sloviter
has upheld the rights of employment discrimination victims and women.
In Bianchi v. City of Philadelphia, writing for the panel, Judge Sloviter upheld
admission of evidence of plaintiffs sexual harassment in a case involving a
etaliation claim even though the plaintiff's Title VII claims had been dismissed. 74
The plaintiff was a male who was harassed because he was perceived as being
gay. "'75 Although his Title VII claims were dismissed, he claimed that he was
retaliated against based on the exercise of his First Amendment rights and that his
procedural due process rights were violated.'76 The court, via Judge Sloviter, held
that the sexual harassment evidence was probative on the issue of whether the
adverse employment action was caused by protected activity-in this case, his
complaining about the harassment. 177
Judge Sloviter wrote a very important appellate opinion on state regulation of
abortion. In American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v.
Thornburgh,'78 Judge Sloviter considered the constitutionality of a variety of
provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act.'79 Among the provisions
challenged was the minor parental consent portion of the statute, which Judge
Sloviter enjoined because the state had not yet provided the details of the judicial
bypass mechanism whereby a minor seeking an abortion could avoid obtaining
parental consent.' Various other portions of the act were struck as well. In
171. International Association of Women Judges, What We Do, at
http://www.iawj.org/what/jep.asp (last visited May 2, 2005).
172. See id.
173. 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JuDiciARY, 3d Cir., at 13 (Christine Housen et at. eds. 1998).
174. 80 Fed. Appx. 232, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2003) (unpublished decision).
175. Id. at 234.
176. Id. at 235.
177. Id. at 235-36.
178. 737 F,2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984).
179. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (West 2000).
180. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 297.
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another case, Judge Sloviter held that anti-abortion activists could be held liable
under civil RICO for intimidating and harassing a women's health clinic, which
resulted in property damage.' 8' In these decisions, Judge Sloviter was protective of
those trying to exercise their reproductive rights.
H. Judge Patricia M. Wald
Judge Patricia M. Wald sat on the federal appellate court for the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. Prior to her appointment by President Carter, Judge
Wald worked for legal services-oriented organizations and the Department of
Justice." 2 Judge Wald is also the mother of five children. The author of several
great dissents that were ultimately (and least temporarily) held correct by the U.S.
Supreme Court,' 3 Judge Wald was frequently mentioned for a U.S. Supreme Court
appointment.'84 In her decisions, and perhaps especially in her dissents, she
revealed herself as an advocate for civil rights and the interests of members of
minority groups.
Judge Wald dissented in Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford v. FCC, 5 a District
of Columbia Circuit Court case that ultimately struck down on equal protection
grounds an FCC preference for minority-owned businesses in distress sales of
television stations. Disagreeing with the majority, Judge Wald found the
government's interest in broadcast diversity-the objective of the FCC's program-
to be compelling and consistent with Supreme Court precedent on affirmative action
programs.1 6 Reviewing the reasons the FCC provided for implementing this
program, Judge Wald reasoned that the program provided opportunities for
members of minority groups to buy stations, which would lead to broadcast
diversity, or, at least, it was the best method that the government had at its disposal
for such purposes. I 7 While she acknowledged "[t]he evidence supporting these
findings has typically been anecdotal rather than statistical," she also understood the
difficulty in proving something like diversity in broadcasting statistically, especially
when there was a "dearth of minority broadcasters," making "it quite difficult to
draw empirical conclusions concerning the programming offered by minority-
owned stations."'8 8 Instead, she was more deferent to Congress' and the FCC's
judgment that this program was the most effective means available for "significant
minority participation in programming."' 9
181. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1346-50 (3d Cir. 1989).
182. 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 173, D.C. Cir., at 18.
183. See, e.g., Finzerv. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1478-1500 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wald, J., dissenting),
aff'd in part and rev'd n part sub nom., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Shurberg Broad. of
Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 934-58 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, J., dissenting), rev d by Metro
Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
184. 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, D.C. Cir., supra note 173, at 20-21.
185. 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam), rev 'dsub nom. Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990).
186. Id. at 935 (Wald, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 936-38, 944-48.
188. Id. at 946.
189. Id. at 947.
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In an interesting footnote, Judge Wald acknowledged the importance of television
in the lives of Americans. While Judge Silberman, one of the judges who voted to
strike the policy, argued that there were other media outlets available to minority
group members that lessened the need for this set-aside,'90 Judge Wald instead
explained:
Underrepresentation of minority views in television is particularly troubling. The
impact of television on our daily lives, and those of our children, is unquestionably
greater than that of print media.
"Unlike print, television does not require literacy. Unlike the movies, television is
'free' ... and it is always running. Unlike the theater, concerts, movies, and even
churches, television does not require mobility. It comes into the home and reaches
individuals directly. With its virtually unlimited access from cradle to grave, television
both precedes reading and, increasingly, preempts it.""'
Judge Wald broadly interpreted the concept of remedying past discrimination,
arguing that it does not apply only to individuals who have experienced
discrimination, but also "seeks to address the lasting effects of our nation's long
history of racial discrimination."' 92 Further, Congress can go beyond remedying its
own past discrimination in creating affirmative action plans.'"9 While Judge Wald
was unsuccessful in convincing her colleagues that the program could withstand
constitutional scrutiny, her position ultimately prevailed, if only for a short time,
and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the program, using intermediate scrutiny.' 94 In
acknowledging the government's compelling interest in broadcast diversity, Judge
Wald sought to broaden access to an important avenue of communication to
members of minority groups. With a sympathetic understanding of the importance
of diversity in this all-important media outlet, she wrote a well-reasoned and
thorough dissent, advocating for opportunities for minority-owned businesses.
Judge Wald has likewise authored important opinions on the First Amendment.
In Finzer v. Barry, she dissented in a case involving the validity of a ban on
picketing within 500 feet of a foreign embassy. 9' Judge Wald saw the case as
involving discrimination, whereby some demonstrators were subject to the ban,
while others were not.'96 Placing this case in the context of conflicts between the
United States' international obligations/security interests and the First Amendment,
Judge Wald eloquently stated that "even within the shadow of treachery and
terrorism, we must not too hastily surrender our free speech birthright to phantom
190. Id. at917.
191. Id at 948 n.35 (quoting UNITED STATES COMMVSSION ON CiviL RIGHTS, WINDOW DRESSING
ON THE SET: AN UPDATE 44 (1979) (quoting Gerber & Gross, Living with Television: The Violence
Profile, 26 J. COMM. 173, 176 (Spring 1976))).
192. Id at 952.
193. Id. at 953.
194. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568-73 (1990). Metro Broadcasting was ultimately
overruled in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penal, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
195. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub
nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
196. Id. (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
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national security interests and international obligations. We must at least demand
reasonable proof that genuine issues of security or treaty obligations are
implicated."' 97
Judge Wald has furthered the interests of employment discrimination victims in
a variety of ways. In United States v. Young, she upheld a criminal contempt
sanction directed against a District of Columbia Department of Corrections
employee who retaliated against sexual harassment victims in contravention of an
injunction issued in a civil class action."' She also argued that reinstatement may
not be an appropriate remedy where there were allegations that the plaintiff sexually
harassed his co-workers.'99 Judge Wald's service to the legal profession extends
well beyond her service to the court and other organizations. She has provided
extensive commentary on a variety of issues, such as the role of the courts," 0 and
the situation of women in the legal profession and society.2"'
M. CONCLUSION
While political scientists' studies have not always shown women judges to be
"pro-woman," the judges who have participated in this symposium have been
advocates of employment discrimination plaintiffs, civil rights plaintiffs, and the
interests of children. While these judges have not always taken pro-woman
positions,"' they have provided opportunities to members of groups
underrepresented in the judiciary. In some cases, their analyses considered the
realities of the difficulties in the lives of women and children. In other instances,
they appealed to higher principals-such as the importance of civil liberties and
public debate. While there may be no distinctive "feminine voice" in these
opinions, these judges, through their careers and the body of law they have created,
have made the courts more hospitable to those who are outsiders to the system.
197. Id.
198. 107 F.3d 903, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
199. Webb v. District of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
200. See, e.g., Patricia Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the
Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621 (1994); Patricia Wald, Collegiality on a Court, 40 FED. B. NEWS
& J. 521 (Sept. 1993); Patricia Wald, The Role ofthe Judiciary in Environmental Protection, 191 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 519 (1992).
201. See, e.g., Patricia Wald, Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: A Reaction, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
603 (1996).
202. See, e.g., Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279 (11th Cir. 2005) (Sloviter, J.).
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